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Summary 
This article examines institutional experimentation by linking the dynamics of capital 
accumulation, the adoption of new digital technologies within the labour process, and 
institutional settings. Our inductive qualitative case study within the service (logistics) 
sector in Europe sheds light on the processes through which local stakeholders 
engage in workplace change through institutional experimentation. It also illustrates 
how and under which conditions unions can act as political agents of transformation 
to influence work and employment.  
 
Résumé 
Cet article examine l'expérimentation institutionnelle en mettant en corrélation la 
dynamique de l'accumulation du capital, l'adoption des nouvelles technologies 
numériques dans le processus de travail et les cadres institutionnels. Notre étude de 
cas qualitative inductive menée dans le secteur des services (logistique) en Europe 
apporte un éclairage sur les processus à travers lesquels les acteurs locaux 
s'engagent dans des changements sur le lieu de travail par le biais de 
l'expérimentation institutionnelle. Elle illustre également comment et sous quelles 
conditions les syndicats peuvent agir en tant qu'agents politiques de transformation 
en vue d'influencer le travail et l'emploi.  
 
Zusammenfassung 
2 
 
 
 
 
Keywords 
Experimentation, trade unions, workplace, institutions, power, agency, service  
 
Corresponding author: Valeria Pulignano, Centre for Sociological Research 
(CESO), Faculty of Social Science, Parkstraat 45, 3000 Leuven, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.  
Email: valeria.pulignano@kuleuven.be   
 
  
3 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Comparative employment and industrial relations debates within the tradition of 
political economy have focused on the importance of institutions in structuring work 
and employment, and as factors explaining employment outcomes. In particular, 
institutional change theory has accounted for agency and power as relevant factors 
when examining the interaction between large firms and employment regulatory 
systems (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). However, we have little knowledge on the 
connections between the various layers of the political economy and the forms of 
social agency at each distinct level. This requires the dynamics to be identified and 
the processes to be explored through which stakeholders at specific national, 
industry and organisational levels are able to engage in workplace change by 
experimenting with novel ways to achieve their objectives and protect their interests.   
 
In accordance with labour process theory, agency is situated within specific 
labour processes where value is created and captured (Thompson and Vincent, 
2010). Thus, processes of capital accumulation are important to understand how 
change in workplaces occurs and to explain its effects on work and employment. It is 
our contention that this is particularly important when considering the digital 
technological transformations underpinning distinct logics of capital accumulation, as 
the latter are at the core of new business models and point to the emergence of new 
practices within both emerging and traditional industries. This article examines two 
aspects of this development: a) how the capital accumulation dynamics embracing 
new digital technologies are affecting work and employment in the European 
logistics industry; and b) how and under which conditions are trade unions engaging 
(if at all) in workplace change by experimenting with novel ways to pursue their 
intentions and interests. The term ‘novel’ is used to describe situations in which 
workplace stakeholders take rather unconventional paths when using institutional 
resources to adapt to global competition. One crucial outcome of this development is 
that trade unions may break with the existing norms and rules of a specific 
institutional context, thereby redefining their relation to – or creating the conditions 
for the establishment of – particular institutions. We consider unions doing this as 
political agents of transformation, since their refusal to comply with specific norms 
and rules within particular institutional settings may create scope for the redefinition 
(or the creation) of the latter.  
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Focusing on institutional experimentation, a process drawing on ‘the mutual 
(or co-) constitution of actors and institutions’ (Kristensen and Morgan, 2012: 415), 
this article explores its role within work and employment. In particular, it studies how 
workplace stakeholders engage in institutional experimentation by strategically 
coupling capitalist dynamics and national institutions. We examine the change 
underpinning the emergence of organisational forms of production and work 
organisation for capital accumulation, including the use of digital technology, in the 
parcel delivery and warehousing divisions of the global logistics firm LogCorp in 
Germany and Belgium. We also look at how trade unions are influenced by – as well 
as how they influence – this change, investigating the processes (institutional 
compliance and avoidance) pushing them to experiment. Specifically, we explain 
how and under which conditions unions can reverse the social effects generated by 
accumulation logics. It is our contention that this involves mobilising resources at the 
intersection between unions’ organisational and institutional contexts. We also 
illustrate that those trade unions using these resources in an unconventional and 
novel way are the ones likely to become political agents of transformation.  
Thus, our argument adds to debates on institutional change by demonstrating 
that the core theoretical question is not whether an institution can change through 
players’ everyday practices with that specific institution but why and how that change 
can generate the conditions underpinning their capacity to become political agents of 
transformation. Moreover, we illustrate that the coupling of different forces of change 
positioned at different levels (institutional and organisational) deserves equal 
relevance for the study of how experimentation unfolds, showing how this change 
affects work and employment.  
Our research questions are as follows: how do trade unions engage in 
workplace change through experimentation? Which factors explain their capacity to 
become political agents of transformation at the intersection of capital accumulation 
logics and different institutional settings?   
The case of the logistics industry is relevant from both an empirical and 
analytical perspective. Logistics is a global industry characterised by a predominantly 
low-skilled workforce, low-quality jobs and negative working conditions (Benvegnú et 
al., 2018; Newsome et al., 2013; Gautié et al., in press), as reflected in the fact that 
levels of employment protection in the service (logistics) industry are generally less 
generous than in manufacturing sectors (Giraud and Lallement, 2014). In the context 
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of globalisation, the logistics industry has gone through intense restructuring to 
increase competitiveness by reducing inventory costs, deploying ‘time-compressed’ 
logistics processes, adopting ‘lean logistics’ principles, and outsourcing. This has 
taken place at a time when more and more companies have externalised logistics as 
a ‘non-core activity’, driving up the share of independent providers in the logistics 
market (Wright and Lund, 2006).  
The global marketplace has compelled businesses to transform into customer-
oriented, service-focused organisations, irrespective of the products and services 
they sell. Technology has become indispensable in this development, facilitating the 
almost exponential growth of business and offering firms an all-important competitive 
edge. Indeed, technology provides the opportunity for companies to offer services far 
beyond their primary business concept, thereby reducing their risk of losing out to 
competitors who have adapted their strategies to the technology-based competitive 
environment (Olsen and Connolly, 2000). The importance of technology has also led 
to considerable changes in business practices. As we will illustrate, the adoption of 
digital technologies and innovative business practices have provided the potential for 
companies to reap efficiency gains referred to as improvements in capital 
accumulation processes, for instance through using new digital gadgets (e.g. Google 
glasses or sophisticated scanning devices) (Hamel and Skarzynski, 2001).  
The article is structured as follows. The first part presents the concept of 
institutional experimentation, discussing workplace change as resulting from 
processes of capital accumulation accompanying the adoption of digital technology 
and the emergence of new business models in logistics. The second part introduces 
the research context and methods and presents the findings. The third part 
comprises the conclusion.   
 
Institutional experimentation and capital accumulation: new business models 
in logistics  
Processes of capital accumulation take place through work within a wide variety of 
domains and through different sorts of activities. These domains and activities – as 
Marx clearly described – shape the labour process as distinctively ‘capitalist’. 
Companies seek to adapt to global competition by experimenting with ways which 
can help capital to deal with labour market rigidities and social protections. This may 
require continuous improvement, i.e., building the capacity for self-correction and 
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change (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2005). The process of continuous improvement focuses 
on features (including institutions) key to the process of capital accumulation. 
A substantial number of scholarly and policy debates in organisation studies 
and human resource management (HRM) relate capital accumulation to high-
performance work systems, performance and productivity, and workplace innovation 
(Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Osterman, 1994; Jensen et al., 2013). Central to these 
debates is the role of effective acquisition, deployment and development of human 
capital in how and how much value is created, as well as the role and impact of 
organisational leadership and governance, and managerial approaches and 
practices on value-creation outcomes (Findlay et al., 2016: 3). Nevertheless, linking 
the analysis of capital accumulation to the emergence of new business models 
implies consideration of how it intersects with processes of value creation and value 
capture.  
Value is realised in the marketplace as the result of transformation, 
embeddedness in a wider social structure, and capture or distribution in the form of 
wages, investments, dividends and retained profits. Thus, the role of labour in 
enhancing value creation is underpinned by labour’s share in value capture (Findlay 
et al., 2016). Marx’s analysis of the factors governing value creation sheds light on 
the role of capital to extend its capacity to control as well as to lower the costs of 
production as an essential component of value capture. Reducing the cost of short-
term contracts in the marketplace for the sake of value capture is companies’ 
ultimate goal. This is evident as companies advance forecasting of future demand 
and invest capital to fuel production processes, which not only requires specific 
inputs but also results in delivering distinctive outputs (Agafonow, 2015).  
Alongside these debates, however, there is also evidence that new business 
models necessitate new narratives of how value is created and captured, requiring 
analytical attention (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). By using new technologies, for 
instance, companies can expand globally at astounding speed and with dramatically 
less investment in value-adding assets. Thus, new business models based on such 
technologies are emerging, offering new capabilities and competences and in turn 
opening up new approaches and organisational structures. Such companies engage 
in workplace change through experimentation, a trend particularly evident in the 
logistics sector for three reasons.  
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First, to navigate the uncertainty created by the increasing interconnectedness 
of business, economic and socio-political spheres, companies in the service sector, 
and particularly in logistics, have cut back their investment in physical assets and on-
the-ground operations and invested in digital technology to reach out quickly to 
customers. Secondly, logistics has evolved from a passive, cost-absorbing function 
to that of a strategic factor providing a unique ‘competitive advantage’ (Bhatnagar 
and Teo, 2009). This has changed existing cost structures underpinning the 
economic growth linked to the new business models. Thirdly, logistics companies are 
nowadays part of a nested set of so-called ‘complex adaptive systems’. Flexible 
global production requires efficient logistics. Goods need to be moved quickly and 
surely, at low cost and potentially over long distances. This requires modern 
information and communication technology constantly to monitor and steer the flow 
of goods. Hence, there is increasing reliance on logistics companies, not only to 
move products and materials, but also to assist with new production requirements 
and customer needs. What is important for business is to reach out and serve 
customers around the world in an easier and cheaper way. Moreover, by 
collaborating with developers and technology partners, logistics companies have 
introduced innovative services more frequently and upgraded existing ones.  
How do changes in business practices supported by the use of new 
technologies impact strategies for capital accumulation? Bhattacharya et al. (2017) 
illustrate how new technologies and the growing interconnectivity of devices enable 
companies to add value to their products globally through software features, as 
opposed to delivering features only through a product’s hardware, sold locally. In the 
process, these collaborations transform ‘value chains’ into ‘value networks’, in which 
value addition is no longer sequential and one-dimensional but rather a continuous 
and multi-dimensional activity, whereby a global ‘adaptive system’ can embrace 
many industries, coordinate services and provide innovative solutions to a wide 
range of customers (both individuals and organisations). As the next sections 
illustrate, such transformations are at the core of LogCorp, a company which has 
invested heavily in providing innovative services to customers with a view to 
expanding relationships and networking to gain competitive advantage, while at the 
same time changing work and employment conditions.  
 
Research design and methods  
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Adopting an inductive approach, we conducted a comparative qualitative case study 
on the parcel delivery and warehousing services offered by LogCorp, a multinational 
company with subsidiaries in Belgium and Germany. LogCorp employs several 
hundred thousand staff globally and is a key player in the German and Belgian 
markets.  
The selection of Belgium and Germany was based on their differing collective 
bargaining and representation systems. Whereas uncoordinated decentralisation 
with derogation capacity is a distinct feature of the German industrial relations 
system (including local negotiations on the use of external and internal flexibility), 
Belgium’s system features the centralised coordination of collective agreements with 
hardly any derogation possibilities. Moreover, in addition to the consultation and 
information rights typical of employee representation systems in both countries, 
works councils in Germany have co-determination rights. We expect these 
differences to matter when explaining employment outcomes as the reflection of how 
experimentation unfolds at the intersection of capital accumulation dynamics and 
institutional settings. In particular, we hypothesise that the derogation capacity 
typical of the German system of decentralised bargaining may offer greater scope for 
workplace adaptation and experimentation than in Belgium due to German 
employers’ relatively stronger discretionary power (Baccaro and Howell, 2017). 
However, we also expect Germany’s co-determination law to constrain this power, 
with works councils’ veto rights imposing negotiations and consequently fostering 
consensual management and labour relationships (see Table 1). 
Guided by the research questions, the selection of LogCorp and its two 
business divisions (warehousing and parcel delivery) follows the principle of 
purposeful sampling, whereby information-rich cases are selected to generate case-
based in-depth insights rather than empirical generalisations (Patton, 2002). Cases 
were selected based on an analysis of secondary data and intense consultation and 
discussion with four experts from the International and European Transport Worker 
Federations (ITF/ETF) and UNI Europe. 
 
Table 1. Country-based institutional features. 
  
 Germany Belgium 
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Collective 
bargaining  
Uncoordinated 
decentralisation  
Centralised coordination 
Derogation from 
sectoral 
agreements 
Possible via ‘opening 
clauses’  
Hardly any possibilities 
Union density 17% (2016) 54.2% (2015) 
Representation 
structures 
Information, consultation, 
co-determination (veto 
power) 
Information, consultation (no 
co-determination) 
Working-time 
regulation   
Local-level regulation 
possible through opening 
clauses 
Sectoral regulation; limited 
derogation possibilities 
Agency work 
regulation   
Co-determination does not 
include veto right on the use 
of agency work 
No co-determination and no 
veto rights  
Source for union density: OECD.Stat. 
 
We collected different kinds of primary data between 2017 and 2019 to 
identify and analyse the dynamics and ways in which value logics affected work and 
employment in the business divisions. Data resulted from semi-structured interviews 
with experts (n=6), (HR) managers (n=17), local employee representatives (n=5) and 
workers (n=15), each lasting one to three hours. Respondent selection was 
conceptually driven although we also used snowball sampling to identify 
interviewees throughout the data collection process (Patton, 2002). In addition, we 
used ethnographic methods including observations of workers and work processes 
in four sites (warehouses and logistics hubs) for about seven days. We participated 
in three trade union meetings in the logistics sector, enabling (informal) talks with 
industry experts, employee representatives and external experts including 
journalists, and in the 2019 annual shareholder meeting of LogCorp. To complement 
our primary data and triangulate information gathered in different ways, we also 
analysed a range of secondary material, including data and reports on the logistics 
industry, articles published in specialist logistics journals and newspapers, as well as 
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(annual) company and union reports. NVivo was used to structure and analyse the 
collected data.  
 
The case of LogCorp 
 
Workplace transformation and effects on work and employment      
A growing number of companies have outsourced warehousing in recent years, 
generating a (low-margin) market for providers like LogCorp, a company in 
competition with other contract logistics firms offering low-price warehousing 
operations. Logistics management is constantly seeking to increase profit margins by 
enhancing customers’ dependency through taking over ever-larger parts of a 
customer’s value chain. Investments in service innovation are the way in which 
LogCorp attempts to increase its profitability and strengthen customer retention. As a 
result, LogCorp has been transformed from a ‘usual supplier’ into an innovative 
partner for customers. This transformation implies the constant development of novel 
service solutions to increase profits, while enabling cost and/or time savings and the 
introduction of lean and/or more efficient operations. A country manager put it this 
way: ‘What is changing is the amount of services we add to existing business in 
warehousing’. These services enable LogCorp ‘to establish a special relationship 
with the customer [...] We show our customers that we can offer more than just 
warehousing [...] very often customers ask what else they could do to reduce costs, 
from delivery to distribution, consultation with other customers and so on [...] we 
provide an answer to all this’. Thus, warehousing plays an active role in service 
innovation through optimising the production and service processes offered.  By 
building up a long-term partnership based on service innovation, LogCorp attempts 
to sustain profitability in the long run.  
At the same time, its lean and standardised production processes allow 
LogCorp to adjust promptly to market fluctuations. Digital technology is used to 
increase productivity by steering the circulation of goods. In particular, resource 
planning and monitoring software as well as modern scanning devices constantly 
track the flow of goods, ensure transparency within the labour process and allow 
possible problems in the flow of goods to be detected in real time. New scanning 
systems and devices (vision picking through Google glasses) facilitate picking and 
enable performance to be measured constantly, as well as tracking each worker’s 
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steps or actions. Workers are encouraged to develop new ideas on how to reduce 
problems, promoting additional efficiency gains. According to a company expert, the 
lean management system used in warehousing brings ‘productivity gains of at least 5 
per cent’ and, where individual performance measurement is possible, LogCorp can 
even reach ‘around 10 per cent’. The result is increased work intensity. Moreover, 
technology and process standardisation limit workers’ control over the work 
processes. Technological gadgets steer workers’ tasks and, at the same time, allow 
for the monitoring of key performance indicators like the minimum number of picks 
per hour. When workers do not achieve their target rate, this is discussed in weekly 
one-to-one ‘feedback’ meetings with team leaders. In sum, process optimisation in 
accordance with lean logistics principles fosters a high-performance work culture, 
concomitant with increased work intensity and decreased levels of control for 
employees.  
Service innovation also plays a key role in the parcel delivery division, a 
business driven by the expansion of e-commerce. Such innovations aim at cutting 
costs, strengthening the company brand and increasing customer convenience. 
According to the vice president, the division’s core aims are ‘delivery with speed, 
high quality and low costs’. Thus, a number of new delivery options (timeframe, 
same-day, evening, drop-off delivery, or delivery through package stations) have 
been developed and implemented to offer customers their preferred delivery option. 
As one local manager pointed out, this brands the company as an innovator: ‘We 
direct a customer’s choice [...] we ask him/her where to deliver because s/he bought 
a service including delivery to the home address [...] this helps us brand our product, 
something we need to do to gain competitive advantage’. While providing several 
options for the customer strengthens the brand and underlines innovativeness, it 
also limits the number of costly unsuccessful deliveries requiring at least one further 
delivery attempt.  
The division’s customer-centric strategy is underpinned by digital technology. 
Track-and-trace software enables customers to track the location of their shipment at 
any time. To optimise delivery, couriers now receive their algorithmically optimised 
route planning every morning on their tablets (routes were previously at their 
discretion). The result is reduced autonomy for workers while at the same time 
ensuring speedy deliveries and cutting costs. In the same vein, several couriers in 
Germany reported that managers and customers can see their position through 
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track-and-trace software and can measure performance levels through the number 
of scans or deliveries per hour in real time. Therefore, couriers hesitate to take 
breaks which management can ‘see’ through checking the position of the van and 
the number of minutes without movement, delivery or scanning activity. This again 
leads to work intensification.  
Thus, offering innovative solutions to customers based on the development of 
new services underpins the process of capital accumulation in logistics. Specifically, 
positioning the company as an innovator strengthens the corporate brand. In the 
same vein, customer retention is strengthened by building up a partnership through 
taking over ever-larger parts of a customer’s value chain. Overall, this ensures 
capital accumulation in the long run. At the same time, digital technology affects 
work, particularly because it is used to measure performance and cut costs. As the 
next section illustrates, this process is contested since capital accumulation 
processes are not institutionally neutral. On the one hand, businesses are continually 
searching for novel ways to align with existing institutions (institutional 
experimentation) to guarantee and increase profitability. On the other hand, labour 
may attempt to reverse the social outcomes of institutional experimentation by 
presenting itself as a political agent of transformation in those cases in which it 
breaks with conventional rules and norms typical of the national institutional context 
it operates in. However, in all cases success remains dependent on labour’s capacity 
to use the available power resources at the intersection between organisational and 
institutional contexts.  
 
Institutional experimentation  
Employment outcomes within and across the German and Belgian warehousing and 
parcel delivery divisions reflect the different stakeholders’ attempts to try out ways to 
control the terms and conditions of employment by building on existing regulatory 
structures and institutions. Though the outcome can be advantageous for employers 
and trade unions alike, most of our cases show a general ‘(re)alignment of the 
institutional logic with capital accumulation’ (Pulignano et al., 2019: 14). Within this 
context, labour’s capacity to respond is often contingent upon the institutional and 
organisational resources which trade unions can wield within each workplace. We 
observe two patterns of experimentation, each relating to the dynamics of capital 
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accumulation in warehousing and parcel delivery. The identified patterns are backed 
by evidence from the cases in Belgium and Germany. 
‘Institutional compliance’ is observed in warehousing. Process optimisation, 
lean management and digital technologies support management in handling volume 
fluctuations, a key feature of warehousing. Customers expect the division to provide 
high levels of flexibility as this ensures timely solutions for capital accumulation. The 
number of agency workers has been reduced sharply in the German warehousing 
division. Previously, they were a cheap and flexible source of labour due to the 
relatively substandard collective agreements applying to the agency sector. 
However, due to recent amendments to German law, agency workers now enjoy 
equal pay and entitlements similar to those of permanent workers after nine months 
of employment. This is why warehousing management in Germany now prefers to 
use working-time flexibility to deal with demand unpredictability in a cost-effective 
way. This requires an opening clause in the sectoral agreement allowing local 
solutions to be negotiated by management and the works council through co-
determination. In the context of this regulation, higher levels of working-time flexibility 
through working-time corridors, fluctuating weekly working hours and working-time 
accounts have already been negotiated in a number of German warehouses. As a 
result, costly overtime premiums can be avoided since there is no defined number of 
weekly working hours anymore. One local manager put it this way: ‘Such 
agreements are of particular importance as customers can cause high fluctuations in 
the number of picks, and picks are very labour intensive. Higher degrees of flexibility 
are key to increasing our productivity’. Thus, flexible working-time arrangements 
reflect management’s continuous search to align the existing regulatory setting in 
Germany with warehousing’s distinct accumulation logics. However, after having 
complied with management’s request for working-time flexibility, the works council in 
the investigated warehouse opposed management’s request for further flexibility, 
stating that this would ‘overburden the employees by increasing the level of 
unpredictability in working hours’. Local negotiations on alternative working-time 
arrangements providing higher levels of control for employees thus got bogged 
down, as the works council refused to continue negotiations under co-determination 
laws. In so doing, the works councils expressed their discontent with management’s 
request to increase flexibility, preferring instead to pass the case on to their lawyers. 
Court proceedings have already lasted more than a year and was still ongoing at the 
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time we collected the empirical data, with visible effects on the workplace social 
climate and challenging the spirit of compromise inherent to the German system.  
In Belgium, warehousing meets flexibility requirements via a mix of a limited 
number of agency workers and a certain working-time flexibility on the part of full-
time workers, thereby complying with the regulations of the Belgian institutional 
framework. In recent years, the number of agency workers has been reduced due to 
local union demands. Although equal pay and equal treatment of agency workers are 
stipulated by law, the unions wanted to limit the use of agency work to promote 
stable employment. In particular, they used a combination of organisational (high 
membership levels in warehouses) and institutional (encompassing institutions) 
resources to negotiate a local agreement stating that agency work should only be 
used in situations of unpredictable demand fluctuations, and that the number of 
agency workers should not exceed 10 per cent . One manager added: ‘We 
negotiated a collective agreement stating that every agency worker needed to be 
given a temporary contract after 120 days. This means we don’t use these people for 
too long without giving them any perspective’. Nevertheless, local unions stated that 
only a very limited number of agency workers had received a contract with LogCorp: 
‘The business is volatile, and customers may leave […] management even blames 
us for not being able to offer longer contracts because the collective agreement 
prevents them keeping on these workers as agency workers for a longer period’. To 
gain flexibility, management has invested in multi-skilling to enable job rotation. In 
contrast to Germany, working-time flexibility can only be used within clearly defined 
limits in Belgium. Occasionally, in cases of high workloads, employees may be 
asked to work one to two extra (paid) hours a day but there is no pressure from 
management as local unions, backed by strict regulations on working overtime, are 
successful in preventing staff from overworking.  
‘Institutional avoidance’ has emerged in parcel delivery due to the growing 
pressure on parcel prices and internal costs. In the 2010s in Germany, management 
decided to set up a separate legal entity for parcel delivery to strengthen LogCorp’s 
position vis-à-vis competitors which mostly outsource delivery to (foreign) 
subcontractors, operating under different, usually cheaper, conditions. Although the 
new legal entity for parcel delivery applied the same regional sectoral collective 
agreements, it did not sign up to the advantageous ‘in-house’ LogCorp agreements. 
During a trade union meeting, we talked to several workers who transferred to the 
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new entity on being offered a permanent contract. They pointed out that they had 
had to accept a 25 per cent pay cut, as wages within the new entity were solely 
based upon regional sectoral agreements. Furthermore, workers mentioned 
increased working-time flexibility as well as differences in the amount of holidays and 
pay premiums for weekend work, all to the detriment of their motivation. Moreover, 
the creation of the new entity negatively impacted workers’ solidarity by segmenting 
the workforce and generating inequality in working conditions between different 
groups of couriers.  
Despite a number of attempts (including very visible strikes involving all 
groups of couriers which were not beneficial to LogCorp’s reputation) to prevent the 
setting up of the new legal entity, local unions had no mandate or veto right to stop it 
happening. Once the new entity was set up, the unions sought to organise workers 
to support the formation of works councils and then to follow a strategy of 
progressively regulating working conditions to close the gap between couriers 
employed by the different entities. According to one unionist ‘we organised the 
workforce within the new entity to be able to use membership as resource’. 
Subsequently, works councils were set up to improve workers’ bargaining power vis-
à-vis management. Thus equipped with wide-reaching co-determination rights, works 
councils in various sites were able to negotiate better local working conditions 
relatively quickly, gradually closing the gap, as summarised by one unionist: ‘We 
need works council structures so that we have something to start with, and 
obviously, to maintain what we have and achieve better results through collective 
bargaining in the long run’. This strategy has been successful, with LogCorp recently 
announcing that the new legal entity will be reincorporated into the existing parcel 
division. According to local unions, this is their success: their fight for a mandate and 
subsequent local engagement to regulate working conditions led to nearly equal cost 
structures in both entities, doing away with the need for the new entity.  
In Belgium, LogCorp has a similar strategy to avoid the advantageous in-
house collective agreements being used in competition with companies relying 
entirely on cheaper foreign subcontractors for parcel delivery. This time, instead of 
setting up a new entity as in Germany, management in Belgium increased the use of 
so-called market service providers, external companies taking over parts of the 
delivery chain at lower internal costs to sustain capital accumulation. The Belgian 
unions are not in favour of such practices as ‘those people earn way less than our in-
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house couriers. The managers want them to perform equally well, but they don’t 
want to pay for it’. A sectoral expert reports cases of ‘bogus self-employment’ among 
the providers used by LogCorp and generally underlines the prevalence of negative 
working conditions, including high work intensity, long hours and low pay. To reverse 
the downward spiral in working conditions, Belgian local unions engaged in 
regulating them despite the absence of a mandate directly to negotiate employment 
within external providers. The local unions in Belgium were thus able to limit the use 
of market service providers in LogCorp. A recently concluded agreement envisages 
‘that a minimum of 70 per cent of the workload is to be handled by our own 
personnel, and a maximum of 30 per cent by external providers’, according to a local 
unionist. Management consented because of concerns about branding and possibly 
adverse reputational effects, affecting value creation and value capture and capital 
accumulation.   
 
Discussion and conclusion  
The theoretical and empirical challenge at the core of this article has been to 
identify and explain the processes of institutional experimentation by linking 
dynamics of capital accumulation, the adoption of digital technology within the labour 
process, and institutional settings. The European logistics industry served as a case 
study due to the prevalence of novel business models embracing digital workplace 
technology. Rather than viewing institutional configurations as given, we applied an 
agency perspective to identify the processes through which trade unions shape 
institutions when dealing with management across and within different contextual 
settings, including national and organisational (the multinational’s business divisions) 
settings. This required examination of how unions regain control over the labour 
process by creating and levering institutional and associational power resources 
strongly to represent workers’ interests within digitalised areas of work and 
employment.  
We find two processes operating at the intersection between organisational 
and institutional levels: institutional avoidance and institutional compliance. These 
processes explain how unions engage in workplace change through experimentation 
by complying with (through exploiting) and/or avoiding (through circumventing) 
specific regulatory settings in both warehousing and parcel delivery. Moreover, we 
show how unions are able to drive this change, thereby becoming political agents of 
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transformation. In particular, we observe that this is influenced by (1) the dynamics of 
capital accumulation as part of the mechanisms of control put in place by 
organisations; and (2) national industrial relations settings. Indeed, it is at the 
intersection between the labour process and institutional settings that we observe 
processes of institutional compliance/exploitation and institutional 
avoidance/circumvention, setting the conditions for workplace players to potentially 
become agents of transformation. Hence, our notion of experimentation breaks with 
institutional change literature through not focusing on how institutions and 
institutional change contribute to structuring work and employment. Instead, we use 
a micro-political economy of work approach to explain the way in which capital 
accumulation dynamics and institutional settings account for work and employment 
effects, illustrating how labour and management shape these effects by 
organisational innovation, such as introducing new services and branding strategies; 
and by developing ways to align with institutional settings through institutional 
experimentation processes, i.e., compliance and avoidance.  
In particular, findings illustrate that management seeks advantageous 
institutional alignment with the processes of value creation and value capture and 
capital accumulation by exploiting and/or circumventing specific regulatory settings in 
both warehousing and parcel delivery (Pulignano et al., 2019). Thus, capital 
accumulation dynamics shape the means of institutional alignment, for example by 
enhancing capital’s capacity to deal with labour market institutional rigidities and 
social protections at the lowest risk. However, institutional alignment also creates 
space for labour to respond to capital’s strategies by experimenting with better 
working conditions. Our argument is that this requires unions to invest capacity in 
closing institutional gaps which have enabled employers to circumvent and/or avoid 
existing regulatory structures in the first place. We observe that in both warehousing 
and parcel delivery in Germany, unions pushed through workers’ interests in an 
unconventional and novel way. Specifically, in warehousing the unionised works 
council refused to give its consent when management’s flexibility requests would 
have meant high levels of working-time unpredictability for the workforce. Hence, the 
works council engaged in workplace change through stopping local negotiations with 
management despite the fact that co-determination is inherently based upon 
consensual management-labour relationships in Germany. By contrast, local unions 
active in parcel delivery in Germany first resorted to industrial action and then 
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organised the workforce in the new legal entity created by LogCorp as a way to put 
pressure on the company and to gain a mandate to represent and bargain for the 
workers in the new externalised unit. Local negotiations were successful in bridging 
the gaps in working conditions between the internal workforce employed within 
LogCorp and the external one created in the new legal entity. These local 
negotiations also helped rebuild worker solidarity and re-establish labour power 
between the two segments of the workforce (Doellgast et al., 2019). Conversely, 
local trade unions in Belgium regained control over the labour process by levering 
the existing institutional legacies of centralised collective bargaining and high union 
density to protect and enforce workers’ interests within the digitalised parcel delivery 
and warehousing environment. Trade unions thus used institutional (encompassing 
sectoral bargaining) and associational power resources to limit the use of agency 
work in warehousing, while encompassing bargaining structures were used to limit 
substantially management’s use of market service providers in parcel delivery (to a 
30 per cent maximum).  
The empirical evidence shows how trade unions in Germany and in Belgium 
in warehousing and parcel delivery have adopted strategies to adapt to aspects 
related to existing institutional legacies with a view to rejecting the rules of the game 
imposed by the logics of capital accumulation underpinning business models in the 
different divisions of the investigated logistics company. Trade unions, equipped with 
resources at the intersection between their organisational and institutional contexts, 
have been successful in opposing capital’s attempts to circumvent and/or exploit 
existing institutions. Moreover, the cases indicate how trade unions have used 
organisational and institutional resources to engage in experimentation. In particular, 
they demonstrate that, first, trade unions have identified the causes of bad working 
conditions; and, second, that they have experimented with different ways to improve 
these conditions. Nevertheless, transnational and national comparisons also shed 
light on empirical differences and unexpected outcomes. In Germany, 
experimentation implies that trade unions and works councils have broken with the 
norms surrounding country-specific institutional paradigms such as co-determination, 
for example in warehousing in Germany. In addition, they have used industrial 
action, followed up by organising strategies, a course which may sound 
unconventional within a context traditionally characterised by legal rights of co-
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determination aimed at guaranteeing social peace, as witnessed by the parcel 
delivery strike in Germany.  
Conversely, trade unions in Belgium have mainly strengthened their 
institutional legacies, i.e., centralised collective bargaining and relatively high levels 
of union density. How can we explain this difference? As indicated, it can be argued 
that the uncoordinated decentralised industrial relations setting in Germany sees 
employers enjoying relatively larger discretion (Baccaro and Howell, 2017) in their 
attempts to control the labour process, using existing institutional loopholes to foster 
and support capital accumulation. However, evidence shows that labour unions 
‘equipped with resources at the intersection between their organisational and 
institutional contexts’ can successfully oppose all this, regaining control over work 
and employment.  
This implies that it cannot be taken for granted that all trade unions engaging 
in experimentation become agents of political transformation. In other words, it is not 
automatic for trade unions engaging in experimentation to be agents of political 
transformation. Being such an agent requires ‘out of the box’ thinking and 
‘reflexiveness’. It also implies a capacity to operate in a context stimulating such 
reflexive and unconventional ways of thinking. Specifically, we agree here with 
Kristensen and Morgan (2012) that unions’ capacity to become political agents of 
transformation may be affected by institutions becoming more ‘adaptable’ and 
‘experimental’: for example, in the German case of warehousing, works councils 
deciding to break with established norms under co-determination law. This indicates 
that conceptualising institutional experimentation may require detailed consideration 
of the dynamic and complex interaction between stakeholders and institutions. This 
is increasingly challenging due to the continually changing aspects of the 
surrounding socio-economic and institutional environment in which stakeholders 
operate and will continue to operate in the future.      
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